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We are told by my friend, "Oh, the killer does it; why shouldn't
the State?" I would hate to live in a State that I didn't think was
better than a murderer.
-Clarence Darrow, September 23, 19241
INTRODUCTION
Although there has been a significant international move-
ment to abolish the death penalty for many years,2 recent trends
reveal a still-divergent body of law.' While most western and in-
dustrialized nations have abolished capital punishment-at least
for common crimes,4 the United States continues to support the
practice. This article discusses the status of the death penalty in
* Thompson G. Marsh Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law. I
am deeply grateful to Gary Young and Katherine Nanda, members of the Colorado
Bar, for their assistance in the preparation of this article.
1 ATrORNEY FOR THE DAMNED 96 (Arthur Weinberg ed., 1989).
2 See, e.g., Thailand: Police Wrong to Suggest Widening Death Penalty, BANGKOK
POST, Reuter Textline, Feb. 19, 1993, available in LEXIS, World Library, Txtlne File.
According to Amnesty International, 40% of countries in the world had by
the end of 1988 abolished the death penalty in law and in practice. Thirty-
five other countries had abolished the death penalty for all offenses and 18
for all but exceptional offenses such as murder of a policeman while he was
on duty.
Id.
3 See generally Joan Fitzgerald & Alice Miller, International Standards on the
Death Penalty: Shifting Discourse (1993) (unpublished manuscript on file with au-
thor) (analyzing continuing debates and trends in various international fora).
4 See Group Wants Death Penalty Abolished, UPI, Mar. 2, 1993, available in
LEXIS, News Library ("United States is the only western industrialized nation that
still has a death penalty."). A notable exception to the industrialized countries that
have abolished the death penalty is Japan. Although the death penalty is reserved for
violent crimes such as "multiple murders, murders involving armed robbery, explo-
sions, rape and terrorist attacks," executions are performed in a secretive way. "[N]o
public announcement is made, and the families of many of the condemned do not
know they are dead until they receive a letter asking them to pick up the prisoner's
possessions." Ben Hills, Footsteps of Fear in a Japanese Prison, THE AGE (Melbourne),
May 12, 1993, available in LEXIS, World Library, Txtlne File.
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the United States compared with pertinent international develop-
ments. In the concluding section, I recommend that the United
States join the other western industrial states in abolishing the
death penalty.
I. CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNrTED STATES-RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS
A. General
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."5 Under
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Eighth
Amendment protections are incorporated and made applicable to
the states.6
In interpreting the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause,7
the Supreme Court has sought guidance from the sparse legisla-
tive history of the Eighth Amendment and the tenor of the time of
its enactment.' In 1972, the Supreme Court, in Furman v. Geor-
gia, effectively invalidated the then-existing state capital punish-
ment statutes based on a lack of procedural safeguards for defend-
ants.' After many states corrected these procedural defects to
satisfy Furman, the Court in 1976 affirmed a new generation of
death penalty statutes, holding that the Constitution does not pro-
hibit the death penalty itself.10
As a result of the Court's holding, executions resumed in the
United States in 1977. From this time through March 5, 1993, the
5 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
6 See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962).
7 See generally Ved Nanda, The U.S. Reservation to the Ban on the Death Penalty
for Juvenile Offenders Under the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights-An Appraisal, DE PAUL L. REV. - (forthcoming) (I have borrowed from this
article in the discussion below).
8 See, e.g., Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 368-69 (1910).
9 408 U.S. 238 (1972). "IT]he discretion of judges and juries in imposing the death
penalty enables the penalty to be selectively applied. .. ." Id. at 255. "[Dliscretionary
statutes are unconstitutional in their operation." Id. at 256-57. See infra notes 38-43
and accompanying text (discussing Furman more extensively).
10 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). The sentencing procedures in Gregg
diminished the arbitrary nature of the guidelines that had troubled the Furman
Court. Id. at 206-07. The Court noted specifically that "[n]o longer can a jury wan-
tonly and freakishly impose the death sentence; it is always circumscribed by the




total number of executions in the country stood at 194.11 While
twenty-one states have carried out executions, six of them account
for nearly seventy-five percent of the total: Texas (54), Florida
(29), Louisiana (21), Virginia (18), Georgia (15) and Alabama
(10).12 Twenty-three persons were executed during 1990, fourteen
in 1991, thirty-one in 1992, and six in 1993.13
Currently, the number of executions performed is dispropor-
tionate to the number of persons under sentence of death. To il-
lustrate, by the end of 1991, 2,481 inmates under sentence of
death were imprisoned in thirty-four of thirty-six states that have
statutes authorizing the death penalty.'4 By January 15, 1993,
the number in state prisons had risen to 2,676.1 In 1991, there
were fourteen executions as 266 prisoners, 265 state and one fed-
eral, were added to the death row.'6
Another disturbing characteristic of the death penalty is the
long period of time typically spent by the condemned awaiting exe-
cution. For example, the fourteen prisoners put to death during
1991 had served an average of nine years and eight months before
execution, with the median time on death row for the 2,482 prison-
ers being five years. 7 The length of detention prior to execution,
combined with the conditions on death row, raise a serious ques-
tion which the European Commission of Human Rights character-
ized as the "death row phenomenon." In Soering v. United King-
dom, 8  the court held that the "death row phenomenon"
constituted a violation of Article 3 of the European Convention on
Human Rights, 9 which prohibits tortuous, inhuman, or degrad-
ing treatment or punishment.2 0
11 NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AN EDUCATION FUND, DEATH Row, U.SA. 2 (Winter
1992) [hereinafter DEATH Row].
12 Id.
13 See id.; Lawrence A. Greenfeld, Capital Punishment 1991, BUREAu OF JUST.
STAT. BULL. 1 (Oct. 1992).
14 Greenfeld, supra note 13, at 8.
15 DEATH Row, supra note 11, at 1.
16 Greenfeld, supra note 13, at 1. In addition, there were five males held under
armed forces jurisdiction with military death sentences for murder. Id. at 8, tbl. 4,
note c.
17 Greenfeld, supra note 13, at 1.
18 161 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. at paras. 82, 122-23, Jan. 19, 1989, re-
printed in 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989), Annex, and in 28 I.L.M. 1063 (1989).
19 Id.
20 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, signed Nov. 4, 1959, entered into force Sep. 3, 1963, 312 U.N.T.S. 221,
E.T.S. 5, as amended by Protocol No. 3, E.T.S. 45, Protocol No. 5, E.T.S. 55, and Proto-
1993]
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B. Historical Background
James Madison introduced the Eighth Amendment in the
United States House of Representatives in June 1789.21 It had
been written into Virginia's Declaration of Rights of 1776 by
George Mason, who adopted the language from the English Bill of
Rights of 1689,22 which read, "Excessive Bail ought not be re-
quired, nor Excessive Fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual Pun-
ishments inflicted."2"
As to which punishments were cruel and unusual, seven-
teenth century England left little to the imagination. In 1878, the
United States Supreme Court noted such examples as "where the
prisoner was drawn or dragged to the place of execution, in trea-
son; or where he was embowelled alive, beheaded, and quartered,
in high treason. Mention is also made of public dissection in mur-
der, and burning alive in treason committed by a female."24 Ear-
lier, in 1863, the New York criminal court provided a vivid de-
scription of the various ways in which punishments were inflicted
in England:
Under the direction of the military courts [the convict] was shot.
When condemned by ecclesiastical tribunals, he was not unfre-
quently [sic] burnt at the stake, as if his priestly judges designed
that the heretic, on the going out of this world, should have a
foretaste of the punishment to which they also consigned him in
the next. For treason against the state the great sword of justice
was to fall. The condemned man was sentenced to be hung,
taken down while still alive, beheaded, disemboweled and quar-
tered; with few exceptions, however, the axe of the executioner
only was used, and the criminal was simply beheaded. If how-
ever, in case of high crimes, especially treason, the prisoner stood
mute and refused to plead, he might be sentenced to be pressed
to death, a punishment inflicted by placing the prisoner on his
col No. 8, E.T.S. 118. Article 3 provides: "No one shall be subjected to torture or to
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." Id.
21 See LARRY CiiES BERGSON, THE CoNcEPr OF CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISH-
mENT 7 (1975). It should be noted that Madison substituted "shall not" for "ought not."
Id. "The substitution of the imperative 'shall for the flaccid 'ought' implies that the
prohibition was considered so fundamental that even stronger wording was required
than that of previous documents." Id.
22 See id. at 5; 2 DAVID K WATSON, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNTrED STATES
1506 (1910); Anthony F. Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted":
The Original Meaning, 57 CAL. L. Rv. 839, 840-41 (1969).
23 WATSON, supra note 22, at 1505.




back, naked, in a cold dungeon, with his arms and legs extended
by cords to the four corners, and with iron or stone laid on his
breast, and left till death from cold, or pressure, or exhaustion,
came to his relief. Lastly, for the crime of murder and numerous
other felonies, the criminal was sentenced to be hung by the neck
till he was dead.2"
Punishments in the colonies were no less cruel and unusual;
capital punishment by hanging, burning and breaking on the
wheel were common.26 For the Quakers arriving in North
America in the 1650s, punishments included being "whipped, pil-
loried, stocked, caged, imprisoned,... branded and maimed" by
New England Christians. Also, four Quakers were hanged.28
In colonial Virginia, James Madison's home state, the ducking
stool was a favorite form of punishment, particularly for women.
It consisted of tying a women to a chair and plunging her under
the water "as often as the sentence directs in order to cool her
immoderate heat."29
Reviewing this history, the difficulty experienced by the
Court when it began to distinguish constitutionally prohibited
punishments from those sanctioned by society is understanda-
ble.3 0 Nevertheless, Thomas Cooley, a respected publicist who
was often cited by the Court, concluded that "those degrading pun-
ishments which in any State had become obsolete before its ex-
isting constitution was adopted... may well be held forbidden by
it as cruel and unusual."3
The Court's own approach was to view the Clause as prohibit-
ing excessive punishments out of proportion to the offense, and
those that were inhuman, barbarous, or involved torture.32  In
25 Done v. The People, 5 Park. Cr. R. 364, 383 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1863).
26 Joseph J. Thompson, Early Corporal Punishments, 6 ILL. L.Q. 37, 38 (1923).
27 Id. at 39-40.
28 See id. at 40.
29 Id. at 41.
30 See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958). The Court considered the word
"unusual" as it is used in the Eighth Amendment and proposed that an ordinary
meaning should be applied to its interpretation. Id. at 101 n.32.
31 1 THoIms M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTrrUTIONAL LIITATIONS 694
(8th ed. 1927); see also WATSON, supra note 22, at 1511 ("Usually the term means
punishment which would shock the human mind and feeling, like burning, or cutting
off the members of the body, or throwing the victim into boiling water.").
32 See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405 (1986) ("There is now little room for
doubt that the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment embraces,
at a minimum, those modes or acts of punishment that had been considered cruel and
unusual at the time that the Bill of Rights was adopted."); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S.
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Wilkerson v. Utah,38 for example, the Court did not debate the
propriety of the death penalty, only whether the method-shoot-
ing instead of hanging-was cruel and unusual. The Court held it
was not. 4 A decade later in In re Kemmler, 5 the Court stated
that "the punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of
that word as used in the Constitution. [The word] implies there
[is] something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the
mere extinguishment of life."3 6
277, 286 (1983) ("Although the Framers may have intended the Eighth Amendment to
go beyond the scope of its English counterpart, their use of the language of the Eng-
lish Bill of Rights is convincing proof that they intended to provide at least the same
protection-including the right to be free from excessive punishments."), overruled by
Harmelin v. Michigan, 115 L. Ed. 2d 836; Trop, 356 U.S. at 100 ("Fines, imprisonment
and even execution may be imposed depending upon the enormity of the crime, but
any technique outside the bounds of these traditional penalties is constitutionally
suspect."); Weems, 217 U.S. at 368 ("It has been said that ordinarily the terms imply
something inhuman and barbarous, torture and the like."); In re Kemmler, 136 U.S.
436, 447 (1889) ("Punishments are cruel [and unusual] when they involve torture or a
lingering death...."), overruled by Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Wilkerson
v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 136 (1879) ("[Ilt is safe to affirm that punishments of torture,
such as those mentioned by the commentator referred to, and all others in the same
line of unnecessary cruelty, are forbidden by that amendment to the Constitution."),
overruled by Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). Granucci argues that England's
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause was designed to prohibit "severe punish-
ment, unauthorized by statute and not within the jurisdiction of the court to impose."
Granucci, supra note 22, at 859 (footnote omitted).
The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of Virginia's Bill of Rights of 1776
was interpreted by Virginia's Supreme Court in Hart v. Commonwealth, 109 S.E. 582,
586-87 (Va. 1921). Justice Sims wrote:
It has been uniformly held by this court that the provisions in question in
the Virginia Constitution, which have remained the same as they were origi-
nally adopted in the Virginia Bill of Rights of 1776, must be construed to
impose no limitations upon the legislative right to determine and prescribe
by statute the quantum of punishments deemed adequate by the Legisla-
ture; that the only limitation so imposed is upon the mode of punishments,
such punishments only being prohibited by such constitutional provision as
were regarded as cruel and unusual when such provision of the Constitution
was adopted in 1776, namely, such bodily punishments as involve torture or
lingering death-such as are inhuman and barbarous-as, for example, pun-
ishment by the rack, by drawing and quartering, leaving the body hung in
chains, or on the gibbet, exposed to public view, and the like.
Id.
33 99 U.S. 130 (1878), overruled by Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
34 Id. at 134-35.
35 136 U.S. 436 (1889), overruled by Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). In an
opinion by Chief Justice Fuller, the Court denied petitioner's application for a writ of
error, holding that the enactment of the statute authorizing death by electrocution
was within the legitimate power of the New York State Legislature. Id. at 449.
36 Id. at 447.
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Tracing the history of the legal developments which resulted
in the adoption of the English Bill of Rights, one commentator con-
cluded that England had developed a common-law prohibition
against excessive punishment in any form, and considered it "a
paradox that the American colonists omitted a prohibition on ex-
cessive punishments and adopted instead the prohibition of cruel
methods of punishment, which had never existed in English
law."3
7
C. Selected Supreme Court Cases Since 1972
When the Supreme Court invalidated Georgia's capital pun-
ishment statute in Furman in 1972, it did so on the ground that
the absence of proper sentencing procedures or guidelines ren-
dered the imposition of the death penalty so arbitrary that it con-
stituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments."8 The Court, however, did not decide
whether the death penalty was per se unconstitutional. 39 Rather,
in separate concurrences, Justice Stewart noted that the existing
37 Granucci, supra note 22, at 847. Following events of the "Bloody Assize," Eng-
lish Parliament was summoned and a committee was appointed to draft what was to
be the Bill of Rights. Id. at 854. Granucci disagreed with the historical view that the
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause was a response to the Bloody Assize. Id. He
contended that the random interchange of terms during the original drafts of the Bill
indicated that "[tihe final phraseology, especially the use of the word 'unusual,' must
be laid simply to chance and sloppy draftsmanship," for none of the "cruel" punish-
ments "employed in the Bloody Assize ceased" after the passage of the Bill of Rights.
Id. at 855. He added:
The English evidence shows that the cruel and unusual punishments clause
of the Bill of Rights of 1689 was first, an objection to the imposition of pun-
ishments which were unauthorized by statute and outside the jurisdiction of
the sentencing court, and second, a reiteration of the English policy against
disproportionate penalties.
Id. at 860. Granucci also cited examples of how seventeenth century England at-
tached a "less onerous" meaning to the word "cruel," in that it meant "severe or hard";
and on the topic of punishments, the word "cruel" was used as a synonym for "severe
or excessive." Id.
38 See Furman, 408 U.S. at 239-40. Furman was one of three companion cases
which were granted certiorari limited to addressing the following question: "Does the
imposition and carrying out of the death penalty in [these cases] constitute cruel and
unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments?" Id. at
239. See generally Justice William Brennan, Constitutional Adjudication and the
Death Penalty: A View From the Bench, 100 HARv. L. Ray. 313 (1986) (recounting
Court's voluminous discussion of "cruel and unusual" interpretation).
39 See Furman, 408 U.S. at 240 (holding imposition of death penalty under appli-
cable state statutes violated Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments); see also id. at 310-
11 (White, J., concurring) ("I do not at all intimate that the death penalty is unconsti-
tutional per se . . .").
1993]
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procedures were "wantonly" imposed,40 Justice White stated that
there was "no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in
which [the death penalty was] imposed from the many cases in
which it [was] not,"4' and Justice Douglas observed that guide-
lines were necessary for the fair application of the death pen-
alty.42 Only Justices Brennan and Marshall asserted that the
death penalty was per se unconstitutional.43
Following Furman, several states re-enacted more detailed
death penalty laws.44 In Georgia, a bifurcated approach was used,
under which a determination of guilt and at least one aggravating
circumstance would allow the state to call for the death penalty.45
Then the jury was required to consider any mitigating factors
which could relieve the defendant of the death penalty.46 In 1976
this approach was challenged in Gregg v. Georgia,47 giving the
Supreme Court an opportunity to rule on the constitutionality of
capital punishment itself. A plurality of the Court held that "the
40 408 U.S. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring).
41 Id. at 313 (White, J., concurring).
42 See id. at 253 (Douglas, J., concurring).
43 See id. at 305-06 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 342-59 (Marshall, J., con-
curring).
44 See John W. Poulos, The Supreme Court, Capital Punishment and the Substan-
tive Criminal Law: The Rise and Fall of Mandatory Capital Punishment, 28 ARuz. L.
REV. 143 (1986).
In each state the introduction of legislation seeking to reinstate capital pun-
ishment by a statute specifically designed to comply with Furman's require-
ments preceded or accompanied the [debate over capital punishment].
Thirty-five states enacted such legislation in the four-year period beginning
on June 29, 1972, the day Furman was decided, and ending on July 2, 1976,
the day the Court initially decided the validity of death penalty legislation
enacted in response to Furman.
Id. at 145; see also id. at 238-51 (table of death penalty legislation enacted in 35
states).
45 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1101 (1972) (murder).
46 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2503 (Supp. 1975).
[Tihe judge [or jury] shall hear additional evidence in extenuation, mitiga-
tion, and aggravation of punishment, including the record of any prior crimi-
nal convictions and pleas of guilty or pleas of nolo contendere of the defend-
ant, or the absence of any prior convictions and pleas, provided that only
such evidence in aggravation as the state has made known to the defendant
prior to his trial shall be admissible. The judge [or jury] shall also hear argu-
ment by the defendant or his counsel and the district attorney ... regarding
the punishment to be imposed.
Id. § 27-2503(a). During sentencing, the judge is also required to include in the in-
structions to the jury "any mitigating circumstances or aggravating circumstances...
which may be supported by the evidence." GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1(b) (Supp. 1975).
47 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
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punishment of death does not invariably violate the Constitu-
tion."48 The Court noted that the "death penalty is not a form of
punishment that may never be imposed, regardless of the circum-
stances of the offense, regardless of the character of the offender,
and regardless of the procedure followed in reaching the decision
to impose it." 49 The Supreme Court also upheld death penalty
statutes in Proffitt v. Florida50 and Jurek v. Texas,5 1 since those
state statutes provided guidelines for the admission of evidence of
mitigating circumstances.2
In analyzing the Eighth Amendment, the Gregg Court articu-
lated several notions which should guide application of the Cruel
and Unusual Punishment Clause. The Court acknowledged its
earlier analysis of the Eighth Amendment in Trop v. Dulles,53 in
which the Court observed that the "evolving standards of decency
that mark the progress of a maturing society" must be consid-
ered.5 4 Revisiting the issue in Gregg, the Court further stated
that, while an "assessment of contemporary values concerning the
infliction of a challenged sanction is relevant" in determining the
application of the Eighth Amendment, the penalty "also must ac-
cord with 'the dignity of man,' which is the 'basic concept underly-
ing the Eighth Amendment.'"5 5
It should be noted that the Gregg Court upheld the constitu-
tionality of capital punishment only in cases in which the offender
had deliberately taken the life of the victim. The Court did not
address whether a sentence of death was appropriate for other
crimes.5 6 Subsequently, in 1977, the Supreme Court held the
48 Id. at 169.
49 Id. at 187.
50 428 U.S. 242 (1976). Petitioner had stabbed and murdered the decedent while
burglarizing the decedent's home. Id. at 245.
51 428 U.S. 262 (1976). Petitioner had kidnapped and attempted to rape a ten-
year-old girl before strangling and drowning her in a river. Id. at 264-67.
52 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(2)(b), (c) (West Supp. 1976-77) (directing jury to
consider whether mitigating factors exist which outweigh aggravating circum-
stances); Tux. CODE CRi. PRoc. ANN., art. 37.071(b)(1)-(3) (West Supp. 1975-76) (set-
ting forth special jury questions).
53 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). Petitioner was convicted of wartime desertion by a
general court martial and his citizenship was revoked under the Nationality Act of
1940. Id. at 87-88.
54 Id. at 101.
55 428 U.S. at 173 (applying Trop "dignity of man" standard to penalty restric-
tions).
56 Id. at 187 n.35. "We do not address here the question whether the taking of the
criminal's life is a proportionate sanction where no victim has been deprived of life-
1993] 531
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death penalty unconstitutional for the crime of raping an adult
woman in Coker v. Georgia,57 determining that the sentence is ex-
cessive when the victim is not killed.5 8 The Supreme Court also
invalidated death sentences that same year for kidnapping and
rape, in Eberheart v. Georgia,59 and for robbery, in Hooks v. Geor-
gia60 , and in 1982 for complicity to murder, in Enmund v. Flor-
ida.61 In Enmund, Justice O'Connor explicitly stated in her dis-
sent that "proportionality requires a nexus between the
punishment imposed and the defendant's blameworthiness."62
On the other hand, in the 1987 case of Tison v. Arizona,63 the
Court held that the imposition of the death penalty on a defendant
who participated in a felony with reckless indifference for human
life was constitutional. 64 The Court stated, "[t]he heart of the ret-
ribution rationale is that a criminal sentence must be directly re-
lated to the personal culpability of the criminal offender."65 It
found that the execution of felony murderers was consistent with
the goals of retribution and deterrence.6 6 However, in the 1991
decision of Harmelin v. Michigan, 7 which was not a death penalty
case, Justice Scalia suggested that the Cruel and Unusual Punish-
ments Clause of the Eighth Amendment does not prohibit dispro-
portionate sentences, but rather it prohibits certain methods of
punishment.68
The Supreme Court has also addressed the issue of the age of
the defendant at the time of commission of the crime as a factor in
for example, when capital punishment is imposed for rape, kidnapping, or armed rob-
bery that does not result in the death of any human being." Id.
57 433 U.S. 584 (1977). The petitioner, while serving various sentences for mur-
der, rape, kidnapping, and aggravated assault, escaped from prison and committed
armed robbery, rape, and kidnapping. Id. at 587.
58 Id. at 598 (concluding that death "is an excessive penalty for the rapist who, as
such, does not take human life").
59 433 U.S. 917 (1977) (per curiam).
60 433 U.S. 917 (1977) (consolidated with Eberheart).
61 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
62 Id. at 825 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Here, "proportionality" referred to the
Eighth Amendment requirement of proportionality between the crime and the pun-
ishment such that the punishment does not violate the Cruel and Unusual Punish-
ment Clause. Id.
63 481 U.S. 137 (1987).
64 Id. at 158.
65 Id. at 149.
66 See id. at 151-54.
67 111 S. Ct. 2680 (1991).
68 See id. at 2691-92, 2696, 2701 (Scalia, J., with Rehnquist, C.J.).
532 [Vol. 67:523
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assessing the appropriateness of the death penalty.69 In Eddings
v. Oklahoma,70 the trial court was required by the Oklahoma capi-
tal punishment statute to consider mitigating evidence during
sentencing.71 It had, however, failed to consider evidence of what
the Supreme Court called "Eddings' unhappy upbringing and
emotional disturbance."72  This violated the Court's rule, an-
nounced in Lockett v. Ohio,73 that "any aspect of a defendant's
character or record" must be considered in mitigation at the sen-
tencing stage of a capital trial to avoid violating the Eighth
Amendment.74 The Court therefore vacated Eddings' death sen-
tence under the Lockett rule;75 however, it did not determine
whether the death penalty was per se cruel and unusual punish-
ment, and hence unconstitutional, when imposed on a sixteen-
year-old person. 6
Six years after Eddings, a plurality of the Court in Thompson
v. Oklahoma77 ruled that executing the defendant, who committed
a capital crime at age fifteen, would indeed violate the Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause.78 Writing for four of the Justices,
Justice Stevens looked to the "evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society" 79 to hold such executions
as violative of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the
Constitution.8 0 In an exhaustive review of state legislation re-
garding age requirements for civic participation, Justice Stevens
69 See generally Nanda, supra note 7.
70 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
71 OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 701.10 (1980).
72 Eddings, 455 U.S. at 109. The trial judge stated: "[Tihe Court cannot be per-
suaded entirely by the.., fact that the youth was sixteen years old when this heinous
crime was committed. Nor can the Court in following the law, in my opinion, consider
the fact of this young man's violent background." Id.
73 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
74 Id. at 604.
75 Eddings, 455 U.S. at 105.
76 Id. at 110 n.5.
77 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
78 Id. at 838.
79 Id. at 821 (quoting Trop, 356 U.S. at 101). In discerning such "evolving stan-
dards," Justice Stevens reviewed the determinations of state legislatures and sentenc-
ing juries to confirm the Court's judgment that youths under 16 years of age are not
capable of acting with the degree of culpability that justifies the death penalty. Id. at
821-23; see also id. at 839-48 (tabulating states' laws regarding minimum ages for
certain activities).
80 Id. at 838; see Weems, 217 U.S. at 378 ("The [Cruel and Unusual Punishment]
clause of the Constitution, in the opinion of the learned commentators, may be there-
fore progressive, and is not fastened to the obsolete, but may acquire meaning as pub-
lic opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice.").
1993]
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concluded that most states conferred these adult obligations, priv-
ileges, and responsibilities on persons sixteen years of age and
older."' He also examined state death penalty laws and noted
that of the eighteen states which established a minimum statu-
tory age, all required the defendants to have been at least sixteen
years of age at the time of their offense.8 2 Aside from domestic
legislation, Justice Stevens noted that the practice of other na-
tions could be informative on the issue of "evolving standards,"
and observed that many other nations had rejected the death pen-
alty or declined to apply it to juveniles.8 3
Despite the plurality's strong language that "it would offend
civilized standards of decency to execute a person who was less
than sixteen years old at the time of his or her offense," 4 Thomp-
son was not a majority decision on this point,8 5 and thus, the issue
arguably remains undecided.
In the 1989 consolidated decisions of Stanford v. Kentucky
and Wilkins v. Missouri,86 a bare majority of the Court affirmed
the lower court's imposition of capital punishment on two individ-
uals for crimes which they committed before reaching the age of
eighteen-the defendants were sixteen and seventeen years old,
holding that such punishment does not violate the Eighth
Amendment. 7
Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia noted that under the
Eighth Amendment, "[t]he punishment is either 'cruel and unu-
sual' (i.e., society has set its face against it) or it is not."8 8 Justice
Scalia considered society's "evolving standards" to determine if a
consensus existed that such executions constitute cruel and unu-
sual punishment and concluded that no such consensus existed. 9
"In determining what standards have 'evolved,' however, we have
81 Thompson, 487 U.S. at 824-848.
82 Id. at 829.
8 Id. at 830-31.
84 Id. at 830.
85 Id. at 855 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor concurred on the
ground that the Oklahoma statute, under which juveniles could be tried as adults, but
which had no minimum age requirement for capital punishment, failed to meet the
standard of "careful consideration" required in death penalty cases. Id. at 857. Justice
O'Connor concluded that Oklahoma could not execute a fifteen-year-old under this
law in light of the evidence of national consensus against such action. Id. at 857-58.
86 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
87 Id. at 378-80.
88 Id. at 378.
89 Id. at 380.
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looked not to our own conceptions of decency, but to those of mod-
ern American society as a whole."90 The most persuasive expres-
sions of the public attitude, he wrote, "are statutes passed by soci-
ety's elected representatives."91 'We discern neither a historical
nor a modern societal consensus forbidding the imposition of capi-
tal punishment on any person who murders at sixteen or seven-
teen years of age. Accordingly, we conclude that such punishment
does not offend the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment."92 In other words, the will of the public
currently governs the Court's consideration of the constitutional-
ity of punishments imposed by governments upon juveniles. 93
Justice Scalia also rejected evidence and arguments that
characterized the death penalty for Stanford and Wilkins as dis-
proportionate, and that it failed to serve the "legitimate goals of
penology,"94 namely retribution and deterrence, as required under
Coker95 and Enmund.96 The defense had argued that "juveniles,
possessing less developed cognitive skills than adults, are less
90 Id. at 369.
91 Id. at 370. The existence of statutes declining to impose capital punishment on
criminals under the age of 18 "does not establish the degree of national consensus this
Court has previously thought sufficient to label a particular punishment cruel and
unusual." Id. at 370-71.
92 Id. at 380.
93 But see Trop, 356 U.S. at 104 (Warren, C.J.) (plurality opinion) ("We cannot
push back the limits of the Constitution merely to accommodate challenged legisla-
tion.... [T]he ordeal of judgment cannot be shirked.").
94 492 U.S. at 377. The Court further stated:
All of our cases condemning a punishment under this mode of analysis also
found that the objective indicators of state laws or jury determinations evi-
denced a societal consensus against that penalty. In fact, the two methodol-
ogies blend into one another, since "proportionality" analysis itself can only
be conducted on the basis of the standards set by our own society; the only
alternative, once again, would be our personal preferences.
Id. at 379-80 (citations omitted). Justice O'Connor replied:
In my view, this Court does have a constitutional obligation to conduct pro-
portionality analysis. In Thompson I specifically identified age-based statu-
tory classifications as "relevant to Eighth Amendment proportionality analy-
sis." Thus, although I do not believe that these particular cases can be
resolved through proportionality analysis, I reject the suggestion that the
use of such analysis is improper as a matter of Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence.
Id. at 382 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (citations
omitted).
95 433 U.S. 584 (1977); see supra note 57 and accompanying text.
96 458 U.S. 782 (1982); see supra text accompanying note 61.
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likely to fear death," and "being less mature and responsible, are
also less morally blameworthy."9 7
Similarly, as to mentally retarded offenders whose compe-
tency might be an issue, the Supreme Court remarked in 1989 in
Penry v. Lynaugh,98 that "in the absence of better evidence of a
national consensus against execution of the retarded, mental age
should not be adopted as a line-drawing principle in our Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence."99 Thus, the Court declined to hold
that "the Eighth Amendment precludes the execution of any men-
tally retarded person of Penry's ability [with the reasoning capac-
ity of a seven-year-old] convicted of a capital offense simply by vir-
tue of his or her mental retardation alone."100
Finally, in McCleskey v. Kemp' 01 in 1987, the Court held that
statistical evidence of racial disproportion in death sentences does
not demonstrate arbitrary, capricious, or discriminatory applica-
tion of the death penalty.'0 2 The Court has implicitly supported
capital punishment in several recent rulings noting that potential
jurors who oppose the death penalty will be excluded when their
views would "prevent or substantially impair" the proper perform-
ance of their duties; 03 that under the Eighth Amendment there is
no per se prohibition against admission of "victim input" evidence
97 492 U.S. at 377; see Michael J. Spillane, Comment, The Execution of Juvenile
Offenders: Constitutional and International Law Objections, 60 UMKC L. REv. 113
(1991) (reviewing history of juvenile executions and asserting such executions are
banned by Eighth Amendment as cruel and unusual). See generally Edward Miller,
Note, Executing Minors and the Mentally Retarded: The Retribution and Deterrence
Rationales, 43 RUTGERS L. REv. 15 (1990) (examining Penry and Stanford decisions
and concluding that capital punishment of such offenders violates Eighth Amend-
ment). The petitioners had the assistance of amicus briefs from, inter alia, the Ameri-
can Society for Adolescent Psychiatry, the American Orthopsychiatric Association,
and the Child Welfare League, joined in its brief by other organizations such as the
National Parent and Teachers Association and the National Council on Crime and
Delinquency. 492 U.S. at 388 n.4 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
98 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
99 Id. at 340.
100 Id.
101 481 U.S. 279 (1987). In McCleskey, a black man convicted of armed robbery
and murdering a white police officer, id. at 283, offered a statistical study to show
that blacks who murder whites are 20% more likely to receive capital punishment
than blacks who murder blacks. Id. at 286.
102 See id. at 292-93. The Court held that the statistical study did not demon-
strate a risk of racial bias in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 313; see also
id. at 297-99 (rejecting Fourteenth Amendment claim for failure to show intentional
discrimination).
103 Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985).
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in a sentencing hearing;0 4 and that the practice of bringing re-
peated substantive constitutional challenges based on claims not
raised in earlier state court proceedings is disfavored in federal
courts. 0 5
D. Procedural Fairness Issues Before the Supreme Court in
Recent Cases
1. Sentencing Procedures
Several recent decisions have examined constitutional infir-
mities in state death penalty sentencing. In Stringer v. Black, 0 6
the Court reviewed Mississippi's sentencing law, which requires a
jury finding of one of eight aggravating factors before a death sen-
tence can be imposed.10 7 If an aggravating circumstance is found,
the jury must weigh it against any mitigating circumstances.'-0
In Stringer, the jury found three aggravating factors, one of
which was that "It]he capital murder was especially heinous, atro-
cious or cruel."'0 9 Justice Kennedy, writing for a six-to-three ma-
jority, noted that states which balance aggravating and mitigating
evidence during capital sentencing "[require] that aggravating
factors be defined with some degree of precision."" 0 Vague and
imprecise sentencing instructions violate the Eighth Amendment
because they may lead to "arbitrary and capricious application of
the death penalty.""' The use of a vague aggravating factor per-
mits the sentencer to rely upon the existence of an illusory circum-
stance, creating a risk that the jury will treat the defendant as
more deserving of the death penalty than the defendant might
otherwise be.1 12
The Florida death sentencing statute, which requires both the
jury and the judge to weigh aggravating and mitigating circum-
104 Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2609 (1991). See generally Vivian Berger,
Payne and Suffering-A Personal Reflection and a Victim-Centered Critique, 20 FL&
ST. U. L. REv. 21, 55-59 (1992) (discussing Payne's overruling of Booth v. Maryland,
482 U.S. 496 (1987), and doubting benefit of input to victims' families).
105 McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991).
106 112 S. Ct. 1130 (1992).
107 Id. at 1134; see Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-19(2) (Supp. 1991).
108 Stringer, 112 S. Ct. at 1134.
109 Id.
110 Id. at 1136.
111 Id. at 1135.
112 Id. at 1139; see also Richmond v. Lewis, 113 S. Ct. 528, 537 (1992) (finding
"[e]specially heinous, cruel, or depraved" aggravating factor "unconstitutionally vague
and tainted with Eighth Amendment error").
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stances, 11 3 was challenged in two cases decided in 1992. In Espi-
nosa v. Florida,114 the jury was instructed that if it found that the
murder was "especially wicked, evil, atrocious or cruel," the cir-
cumstances would establish an aggravating factor." 5 The Court
held the instruction invalid for vagueness. 1 6 The Court rejected
Florida's argument that the jury was not the actual sentencer
under the Florida system, noting that Florida case law required
trial judges to give "'great weight' to the jury's
recommendation."" 7
In Sochor v. Florida,18 the Court vacated a death penalty
judgment and remanded the case because the trial judge had con-
sidered an aggravating factor-"coldness"-which the Florida
Supreme Court had ruled was not supported by the evidence."19
This, the Court found, made the factor invalid, and therefore,
weighing it violated the Eighth Amendment. 20
2. Other Death Penalty Challenges
In Gomez v. United States District Court,'2' the Court vacated
a stay of execution and declined to rule on the appellant's fourth
federal habeas corpus petition which argued that execution by le-
thal gas was cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
Eighth Amendment. 22 The Court stated that "[e]quity must take
into consideration the State's strong interest in proceeding with
its judgment and [the appellant's] obvious attempt at
manipulation. "123
In Dawson v. Delaware,'24 the Court held that introducing ev-
idence during sentencing which linked the defendant to member-
ship in the Aryan Brotherhood, "a white racist prison gang that is
113 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(2)-(3) (1991).
114 112 S. Ct. 2926 (1992).
115 Id. at 2927.
116 Id. at 2928.
117 Id.
118 112 S. Ct. 2114 (1992). The defendant was convicted of kidnapping and first
degree murder. Id. at 2118.
119 Id. at 2122. The instruction read, in part, "[Tihe crime for which the defendant
is to be sentenced was especially wicked, evil, atrocious or cruel, and... was commit-
ted in a cold, calculated and premeditated manner, without any pretense of moral or
legal justification." Id. at 2118.
120 Id. at 2122.
121 112 S. Ct. 1652 (1992).
122 Id. at 1653.
123 Id.
124 112 S. Ct. 1093 (1992).
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associated with drugs and violent escape attempts at prisons, and
that advocates the murder of fellow inmates," 2 5 violated the First
and Fourteenth Amendments. 26 Chief Justice Rehnquist, writ-
ing for the majority, noted, "[e]ven if the Delaware group to which
Dawson allegedly belongs is racist, those beliefs, so far as we can
determine, had no relevance to the sentencing proceeding in th[e]
case. For example, the Aryan Brotherhood evidence was not tied
in any way to the murder of Dawsons victim." 27
Justice Thomas, in dissent, responded,
In Barclay v. Florida, the plurality found it relevant that a black
gang conspired not merely to commit crimes, but to commit them
against white persons out of racial hatred. Even if Dawson's
white racist prison gang does not advocate "the murder of fellow
inmates," a jury reasonably could infer that its members in one
way or another act upon their racial prejudice. 128
The issue on appeal in Lockhart v. Fretwell 29 was a Sixth
Amendment claim that defense counsel's failure to raise an objec-
tion during the penalty phase prejudiced his client.'30 The fore-
gone objection would have been based upon an Eighth Circuit de-
cision which held that a death sentence was unconstitutional if
the aggravating factor relied upon was also an element of the un-
derlying felony.' 3 ' Nevertheless, Justice Rehnquist concluded
that "[t]o set aside a conviction or sentence solely because the out-
come would have been different but for counsel's error may grant
the defendant a windfall to which the law does not entitle him." 3 2
Another significant case was Graham v. Collins.133 In 1981,
Gary Graham, age seventeen, engaged in a variety of violent acts,
including murder, over the course of one week.' 3 4 During closing
arguments at his trial, defense counsel urged the jury to consider
125 Id. at 1097.
126 Id. at 1095.
127 Id. at 1098.
M Id. at 1102 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (citing Barclay v. Flor-
ida, 463 U.S. 939 (1983)).
129 113 S. Ct. 838 (1993). In Lockhart, the defendant was sentenced to death
based on his conviction for felony murder. Id. at 841. The Court found the contempo-
raneous commission of robbery to be an aggravating factor. Id.
130 Id.
131 Id.; see Collins v. Lockhart, 754 F.2d 258 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1013
(1985).
132 Lockhart, 113 S. Ct. at 843.
133 113 S. Ct. 892 (1993).
134 Id. at 895.
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Graham's age when passing sentence. 13 r The jury was required to
answer three "special issues" during sentencing:
(1) whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death
of the deceased was committed deliberately and with the rea-
sonable expectation that the death of the deceased or another
would result;
(2) whether there is a probability that the defendant would com-
mit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continu-
ing threat to society; and
(3) if raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of the defend-
ant in killing the deceased was unreasonable in response to
the provocation, if any, by the deceased. 136
Since these questions were answered in the affirmative by the
jury, the trial judge sentenced Graham to death as required by the
statute.'3 7 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected
Graham's appeal, 138 stating that it would require the creation of a
"new rule" of constitutional law, contrary to the principles of
Teague v. Lane. 39 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court granted Gra-
ham's petition for certiorari in light of a contemporaneous
Supreme Court holding that the Texas special issues did not allow
the jury to consider the mitigating effect of a defendant's evidence
of mental retardation and child abuse. 40
In Herrera v. Collins,'4 ' the petitioner filed a federal habeas
corpus petition ten years after his conviction, arguing that newly
discovered evidence established that he was innocent of the
murders for which he had been sentenced to death. 42 In rejecting
the petition, the Court held that newly-discovered evidence is not
a ground for habeas corpus review.' 43 The Supreme Court noted
135 Id. at 896.
136 Id. (quoting TExAs Cram. PRoc. CoDE ANN. art. 37.071(b) (West 1981)).
137 Id.
138 113 S. Ct. at 897.
139 Id.; see Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989). "A holding constitutes a 'new rule'
within the meaning of Teague if it 'breaks new ground,' 'imposes a new obligation on
the States or the Federal Government,' or was not 'dictated by precedent existing at
the time the defendant's conviction became final.'" Graham, 113 S. Ct. at 897.
140 Graham, 113 S. Ct. at 896 (discussing Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989)).
The Texas special instructions were changed in 1991. Graham, 113 S. Ct. at 896 n.1.
For an analysis of the special instructions prior to their revision, see Shelley Clarke,
Note, A Reasoned Moral Response: Rethinking Texas's Capital Sentencing Statute Af-
ter Penry v. Lynaugh, 69 TFx. L. REv. 407 (1990).
141 113 S. Ct. 853 (1993).
142 Id. at 856-57.
143 Id. at 860.
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that "[o]nce a defendant has been afforded a fair trial and con-
victed of the offense for which he was charged, the presumption of
innocence disappears," 44 particularly since there are other consti-
tutional provisions which ensure against the conviction of an inno-
cent person.' 4 5 Federal habeas corpus review is restricted to an
appellant's constitutional claims, 4 6 and "a claim of 'actual inno-
cence' is not itself a constitutional claim, but instead a gateway
through which a habeas petitioner must pass to have his other-
wise barred constitutional claim considered on the merits."
47
Justices Blackmun, Stevens, and Souter dissented, stating
that they would have reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded
on the ground that the Eighth Amendment forbids the execution
of an innocent person.148 "Nothing could be more contrary to con-
temporary standards of decency or more shocking to the con-
science than to execute a person who is actually innocent."' 4
While agreeing that "the execution of a legally and factually inno-
cent person would be a constitutionally intolerable event," Justice
O'Connor, joined by Justice Kennedy, rejected Herrera's claims of
innocence,' 5 0 finding that "[t]he record overwhelmingly demon-
strates that petitioner deliberately shot and killed Officers Rucker
and Carrisalez the night of September 29, 1981; petitioner's new
evidence is bereft of credibility."' 5 '
It seems that despite the Supreme Court's desire to distance
itself from executions and death penalty policy, it is not likely that
it will be able to do so in the 1990s.15
2
144 Id.
145 Id. at 859-60 (discussing rights to confront adverse witnesses, compulsory pro-
cess, effective assistance of counsel, jury trial, and prosecutorial disclosure of exculpa-
tory evidence).
146 Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 860.
147 Id. at 862.
148 Id. at 876.
149 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (suggesting that "[iut also
may violate the Eighth Amendment to imprison someone who is actually innocent").
150 Id. at 870 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
151 Id. at 871.
152 See generally Franklin E. Zimring, Inheriting the Wind: The Supreme Court
and Capital Punishment in the 1990s, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. Rxv. 7, 17-19 (1992) (citing
Court's historical involvement in death penalty cases).
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E. Legislation in the United States
1. Federal Legislation
Since Furman, the United States Congress has enacted four
death penalty statutes, prescribing the death penalty for espio-
nage by a member of the armed forces;' 53 death resulting from
aircraft hijacking; 54 witness tampering resulting in death;155 and
intentional killing or counseling, commanding, inducing, procur-
ing, or causing the intentional killing of an individual or a federal,
state, or local law enforcement official, under specified circum-
stances.'5 6 Several pre-Furman death penalty statutes also re-
main in force.. 5 7
Although a federal death sentence may be imposed for a broad
range of activities, it is noteworthy that only one person is pres-
ently incarcerated under sentence of death. 1s
2. State Legislation
Thirty-six states have capital punishment statutes,' 59 which
leaves fourteen: Alaska, Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Massa-
chusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, North Dakota, Rhode
Island, Vermont, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and the District of Co-
lumbia without such statutes. 60 Capital offenses include first de-
gree murder in Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Louisiana,
Maryland, Missouri, Nebraska, New Mexico, Nevada, North Caro-
lina, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Wyoming; aggravated murder
153 10 U.S.C. § 906(a) (1988).
154 49 U.S.C. § 1472(n)(1)(B) (1988).
155 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(2) (1988).
156 21 U.S.C. § 848(e) (1988).
157 See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 918 (1988) (murder while member of armed forces); 18
U.S.C. §§ 32-34 (1988) (destruction of aircraft, motor vehicles, or related facilities re-
sulting in death); 18 U.S.C. § 115(b)(3) (1988 & Supp. 1992) (retaliatory murder of
member of immediate family of law enforcement officials); 18 U.S.C. § 351 (1988)
(murder of member of Congress, important executive official, or Supreme Court Jus-
tice); 18 U.S.C. § 794 (1988) (espionage); 18 U.S.C. § 844(d)(f)(i) (1988) (destruction of
government property resulting in death); 18 U.S.C. § 1111 (1988) (first-degree mur-
der); 18 U.S.C. § 1716 (1988) (mailing of injurious articles with intent to kill or result-
ing in death); 18 U.S.C. § 1751 (1988) (assassination or kidnapping resulting in death
of President or Vice President); 18 U.S.C. § 1992 (1988) (willful wrecking of train re-
sulting in death); 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (1988) (bank robbery-related murder or kidnap-
ping); 18 U.S.C. § 2381 (1988) (treason); 18 U.S.C. § 1114 (1988) (murder of federal
judges and officers).
158 See Greenfeld, supra note 13, at 8, tbl. 4.
159 Id.
160 Id. at 6, tbl. 1; DATH Row, supra note 11, at 1.
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in Kentucky, Oregon, and Utah; aggravated first degree pre-medi-
tated murder in Washington; murder under aggravating circum-
stances in California, Delaware, Illinois, and Indiana; assassina-
tion and murder, including contract murder and felony murder, of
a specified category of victims in specified circumstances in Ar-
kansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Texas, Vir-
ginia, and Wyoming; treason in California, Georgia, and Louisi-
ana; aircraft hijacking in Georgia, and aircraft piracy in Alabama
and Mississippi; kidnapping when the victim is killed in Colorado
and Kentucky; kidnapping with gross permanent physical injury
inflicted on the victim in South Dakota; kidnapping for ransom or
kidnapping with bodily injury when the victim dies in Georgia;
aggravated kidnapping when the victim or rescuer dies and aggra-
vated assault or aggravated kidnapping by a state prisoner under
specified circumstances in Montana; arson causing death in Ar-
kansas; train wrecking in California; illegal sale of specified drugs
to a person who dies from these drugs in Connecticut; and statu-
tory rape in Mississippi.161
At the end of 1991, thirty-four of the thirty-six states with
capital punishment statutes provided for automatic review of all
death sentences.162 The exceptions are Arkansas, which has no
specific provision for automatic review, and Ohio, which provides
for review by the court of appeals and the supreme court only
"upon appeal" by the defendant.' 6 3 While thirty-one states pro-
vide for automatic review of both the conviction and sentence,
Idaho, Indiana, and Montana only require review of the
sentence.' 64
Further, the minimum age requirement for capital punish-
ment varies among the states. To impose the death penalty,
eleven states, as well as the federal government, require a mini-
mum age of eighteen at the time of the offense.16 1 In four states,
Georgia, New Hampshire, North Carolina, and Texas, the of-
fender must be seventeen years old when the crime occurs,
although in North Carolina, if the offender commits murder while
incarcerated for a prior murder, the minimum age may be reduced
161 Greenfeld, supra note 13, at 6, tbl. 1.
162 Id. at 7.
163 Id. The federal death penalty procedures also do not provide for automatic
review. Id.
164 Id.
165 Id. at 7, tbl. 3.
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to fourteen. 166 Death penalty statutes in Alabama, Indiana, Ken-
tucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, Oklahoma, and
Wyoming apply to offenders sixteen years of age and older.167 In
Virginia, the minimum age is fifteen; in Arkansas and Utah, it is
fourteen; and in South Dakota, a ten-year old offender may be eli-
gible for capital punishment, but only after a transfer hearing
wherein the juvenile is tried as an adult.168 Eight states-Ari-
zona, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Montana, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, and Washington-do not specify a minimum age for im-
position of the death penalty. 6 '
Finally, as to the methods of execution, twenty-two states use
lethal injection, twelve use electrocution, six use lethal gas, three
use hanging, and two use a firing squad. 170
II. EVOLVING INTERNATIONAL NoRms WIm RESPECT
To CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
A. International Instruments
The movement to abolish capital punishment world-wide has
witnessed steady, but not energetic, growth.' 71 As early as 1968
the United Nations General Assembly declared its objective of
gradually but progressively restricting the range of offenses pun-
ishable by death.1 72 Since that time the U.N. has not departed
from its ultimate goal of abolition, but what began as an ambi-
tious movement has met with increasingly focused opposition in
the last several years.
The 1980s came to a close with the General Assembly's adop-
tion of the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights in December 1989.173 Aiming at the
abolition of the death penalty, 174 the Protocol obligates represent-
atives of each state to "take all necessary measures to abolish the




170 Id. at 7, tbl. 2.
171 See generally Fitzgerald & Miller, supra note 3.
172 Capital Punishment, U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 23d Sess., Agenda Item 59, U.N.
Doc. A/Res/2393 (XXIII) (1968).
173 Elaboration of a Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty, U.N. GAOR 3d
Comm., 44th Sess., Agenda Item 98, U.N. Doc. A/Res/44/128 (1990).
174 See id. at operative para. 2.
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death penalty within its jurisdiction."175 The vote on promulga-
tion of the Protocol in the Third Committee was 55-28-45,176 re-
flecting the dissent on substantive grounds by the Islamic bloc
countries that oppose abolition as antithetical to their religious
precepts.177
Other international actions also highlight the movement to
abrogate capital punishment. For example, in 1983 Protocol Six
to the European Convention on Human-Rights declared the aboli-
tion of the death penalty in time of peace.178 This was based on a
1973 resolution that capital punishment was "inhuman and de-
grading within the meaning of Article 3 of the European Conven-
tion"'7 9 and a 1962 study of the death penalty in Europe. 8 0
In addition, the 1984 Protocol to the American Convention on
Human Rights to Abolish the Death Penalty resolved "in accord-
ance with the spirit of Article 4 [of the Convention] and the uni-
versal trend to eliminate the death penalty, to call on all countries
in the Americas to abolish it." 18  Nonetheless, in the 1990 debates
on the Protocol, the United States voiced particularly strong
dissent.'8 2
B. State Practice
The United States has not joined the international movement
to abolish capital punishment. During the 1980's, twenty coun-
tries abolished the death penalty for all crimes, four abolished it
for ordinary crimes, 8 3 and several instituted moratoria on execu-
175 See id. at Annex, art. 1(2).
176 International Covenants on Human Rights, U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 44th Sess.,
Agenda Item 98, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/44/824 (1989).
177 For extensive discussion, see Fitzgerald & Miller, supra note 3, at nn.262-323
and accompanying text.
178 Protocol No. 6 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fun-
damental Freedoms Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty, opened for signa-
ture Apr. 28, 1983, Europ. T.S. No. 114, reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 538 (1983) (entered into
force Mar. 1, 1985).
179 EuR. CONsuLT. Ass'N, 25th Sess., Doc. No. 3297, at 2 (1973).
180 CouNCIL OF EURoPE, THE DEATH PENALTY IN EuRoPEAN CouNTRIEs (1962).
181 Inter-Am. C.H.R., Annual Report 1984-1985, OAS. Doc. OEA/ser. LNAJVI.77,
doc. 10 rev. 1, at 10 (1985).
182 Asamblea General, Actas y Documentos, volumen II, primera parte, O-A.S.
Doc. OEA/ser. P/XX.O.2, at 250-51 (1991), cited in Fitzgerald & Miller, supra note 3,
n.337.
183 AmNESTY INT'L, THE DEATH PENALTY. LiST OF ABoLIoTINSr AN RIETENIroNsT
CoUNRIsS, ACT 50/01/93 tbls. 1 & 2 (Feb. 1993).
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tions.18 1 In addition, twenty countries and territories retain the
death penalty for ordinary crimes, but have not executed anyone
during the past ten years or more.185 No western country reintro-
duced the death penalty during this period. In contrast, ten states
in the United States began executing criminals during this
decade. 186
According to a recent Amnesty International report, the
United States is in the company of China, Muslim countries, and
third world nations, primarily in Africa, in continuing the practice
of executions. 8 7 As of February 1993, forty-nine countries had
abolished the death penalty for all crimes, 8' and an additional
fifteen have abolished it for all but exceptional crimes.189 Cyprus,
Italy, Malta, Spain, and the United Kingdom are the only Western
European countries which impose the death penalty and then only
for exceptional crimes. 90 In addition, several Central and East-
ern European countries-Croatia, the Czech Republic, the Ger-
man Democratic Republic (now part of Federal Republic of Ger-
many), Hungary, Romania, the Slovak Republic, and Slovenia-
have joined the Western European countries in abolishing the
death penalty.'-'
C. Emerging International Standards With Respect to Capital
Punishment of Juvenile Offenders
1. Customary International Law?
Although the prohibition of the death penalty appears to re-
sist the formulation of a tangible prohibition, its non-application
to juveniles, those under the age of eighteen at the time of their
offenses, is clearly emerging as customary international law.192
Of particular importance is a series of international instruments
explicitly forbidding the use of capital punishment for juveniles.
These instruments include: the International Covenant on Civil
184 See id. tbl. 3.
185 See id.
186 See Franklin E. Zimring, Ambivalence in State Capital Punishment Policy:An
Empirical Sounding, 18 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 729, 732 tbl. 1 (1990-91).
187 AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 183, at tbl. 4.
188 AMNESTY ITL, U.S.A-, THE DATH PENALTY: LIST OF ABOLrrIONIST AND
RETENTIONisT CoUNTRIEs 2 (Mar. 10, 1993).
189 Id. at 3. 'Exceptional crimes" are those defined under military law or crimes
committed in exceptional circumstances such as in wartime. Id.
190 Id.
191 See id. at 23.
192 See generally Nanda, supra note 7.
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and Political Rights, the American Convention, 193 the Fourth Ge-
neva Convention, the Convention Relative to the Protection of Ci-
vilian Persons in Time of War,'9 4 the 1977 Protocols to the Geneva
Conventions, the Additional Protocol relating to the Protection of
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), and the Ad-
ditional Protocol relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-Inter-
national Armed Conflicts (Protocol H),195 and the Convention on
the Rights of the Child.196 The movement toward abolition of the
death penalty for offenders under eighteen is further embodied in
a series of United Nations resolutions and safeguards enacted
throughout the 1980s.197 Even the United States may arguably be
bound by this customary rule of law, despite its recent reservation
to its ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Polit-
ical Rights.'
The reservation of the United States to the juvenile death
penalty provision of the International Covenant presents an inter-
esting question.'9 9 It is arguable that under the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights such a reservation is not
permitted. 20 0 Furthermore, a persuasive argument can be made
193 Id. at art. 4(5).
194 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 68, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 3560 T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287,
330.
195 Geneva Protocol I1 Relating to the Protection of the Victims of Non-Interna-
tional Armed Conflicts, art. 6(4), reprinted in 16 LL.M. 1442, 1446 (1977).
196 Convention on the Rights of the Child, U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 44th Sess.,
Agenda Item 108, U.N. Doc. A/RES/44125 (1989) adopted without vote Nov. 10, 1989.
The Convention is annexed to the resolution.
197 The United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) adopted a resolu-
tion at its 1984 Session which embodies a series of safeguards guaranteeing protec-
tion of the rights of those facing the death penalty. Safeguard 3 provides: "Persons
below 18 years of age at the time of the commission of the crime shall not be sentenced
to death...." The Seventh U.N. Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treat-
ment of Offenders endorsed the safeguards in 1985; in May 1989 ECOSOC adopted
another resolution inviting member states to review their legislation for the death
penalty safeguards if they had not yet done so (the U.S. has not yet conducted such a
review); and in December 1989 the U.N. General Assembly adopted the ECOSOC res-
olution on implementation of the safeguards without a vote.
198 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, adopted May 22, 1969, art.
19(c), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980).
199 Id. at 336 (directing that state may not formulate reservation which is "incom-
patible with the object and purpose of the treaty").
200 See G.C. Fitzmaurice, Reservations to Multilateral Conventions, 2 INfL &
ConP. L.Q. 1 (1953); John F. Gamble, Reservations to Multilateral Treaties: A Macro-
scopic View of State Practice, 74 A.J.I.L. 372, 393 (1980); Note, The U.S. Death Pen-
alty Reservation to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Exposing
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that under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties such a
reservation is incompatible with the objects and purposes of the
Covenant.20 1
1. State Practice
An overwhelming number of countries have abolished the
death penalty for offenders under the age of eighteen. At least
seventy-two countries do not allow the death penalty for offenders
below eighteen,2 °2 including notably Russia, South Africa, Syria,
Paraguay, and Libya. Twelve more countries have acceded to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights without res-
ervations to the relevant provisions of those treaties and may
therefore be considered to have tacitly abolished the juvenile
death penalty.20 3 In contrast, the United States stands alone
among the industrialized nations in applying the death penalty to
juveniles between the ages of sixteen and eighteen at the time of
their crimes.20 4
Of the reported juvenile executions between 1981 and 1991
worldwide, four were carried out in the United States, one in Bar-
bados (which subsequently changed its minimum age for capital
punishment to eighteen), one in Nigeria, one in Bangladesh, and
three in Pakistan.20 5 An unknown number of juvenile offenders
have been executed by Iran and Iraq.2 °8 In 1992, another juvenile
was put to death in the United States.20 7
III. APPRAIsAL
As noted by one participant in the process, "[e]verything that
could be said for and against the death penalty has already been
the Limitations of the Flexible System Governing Treaty Formation, 29 TEX. INV'L L.J.
- (forthcoming).
201 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 198, at 336.
202 AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 183, at 78-79.
203 Id.
204 See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988). It is debatable whether
Thompson actually set the minimum age limit for the death penalty at sixteen, since
only four of the justices-Stevens, Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun-stated that
conclusion, with Justice O'Connor concurring in the result on separate grounds relat-
ing to the age limit in the state statute rather than on the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments. Id. at 858.
205 AmNEsTY INT'L, supra note 183.
206 AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 183, at 79.
207 See Victor L. Streib, The Juvenile Death Penalty Today 2 (Cleveland-Marshall
College of Law, Report Document of Feb. 1, 1993). Johnny Garrett, age 17 at the time
of his offense, was executed on February 11, 1992 in Texas. Id.
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said. What remains is to make a choice."20  The debates that
have continued on the international scene for so many years have
indeed remained inconclusive; no international consensus has yet
emerged regarding abolition of capital punishment.
Similarly, there is no consensus within the United States.
The one forum in which U.S. capital punishment law is receiving
its most active public consideration is the Supreme Court. In sev-
eral recent cases, such as Thompson and Stanford, serious discus-
sion has taken place regarding the influence of international
trends upon the American debate. Although such arguments have
been rejected by a plurality of the Court, they are derived from
historical precedents and sound comparative principles, and will
be made again. Regardless of whether the Court adopts these ar-
guments, it can nevertheless analyze, in its own search for "evolv-
ing standards of decency," the same arguments put forth in the
various international and national fora around the world, some of
which have found, for example, that capital punishment does not
serve its intended goals of retribution and deterrence.
The Supreme Court may allow its consideration of the Eighth
Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause to be in-
formed by evidence of international practice. Although at present
customary international law does not prohibit the death penalty,
the world community has in great measure supported the aboli-
tion of capital punishment in the case of juvenile offenders. As
this principle crystalizes, the arguments in favor of its usage as a
principle of U.S. law under the Supremacy Clause of Article VI of
the United States Constitution will become more compelling. In
the meantime, should the Court continue its reliance exclusively
on American practices, its rulings will appear increasingly
inappropriate.
As to the Court's interpretation of the Eighth Amendment,
opponents of capital punishment have argued that the Court
should read the words "cruel and unusual" disjunctively rather
than conjunctively since there is no authoritative record of what
the first Congress meant in using the phrase. 09 Professor Don-
208 Report on the abolition of capital punishment by Mr. Lidbom, Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe, 32d Sess., Doc. 4509 at 4 (1980), quoted in Fitzger-
ald & Miller, supra note 3, at n.253.
209 See Samuel J.M. Donnelly, Capital Punishment: A Critique of the Political
and Philosophical Thought Supporting the Justices' Positions, 24 ST. MARY's L.J. 1,
100-01 (1992). Professor Donnelly stated that the Eighth Amendment bears a striking
resemblance to the British Bill of Rights and the Virginia Declaration of Rights and
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nelly contends that a "miajoritarian interpretation of the Eighth
Amendment seems most likely of the competing interpretations to
be in disagreement with [the Founding Fathers'] views."21 °
Critics also argue that the Eighth Amendment prohibits capi-
tal punishment because it does not serve legitimate penological
functions and because it is particularly barbarous and cruel.
These arguments deserve serious consideration both by Congress,
the state legislatures, and the Supreme Court. The United States
should join the majority of western nations in abolishing the death
penalty.
there is evidence that at the time of the adoption of the Eighth Amendment "and" and
"or" may have been used interchangeably. Id. at 100 n.532.
210 Id. at 101 (noting founding fathers were distrustful of majority).
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